Socrate, overo, Dell’humano sapere esercitio seriogiocoso (Socrates, or On Human Knowledge)
Simone Luzzatto
1651
Socrates’ defence was very carefully heard in the presence of the Academicians in the public assembly over a few days, and it produced no little disquiet in the minds of the judges, whose minds turned to different opinions: many not only inclined to his absolution, but they furthermore considered it reasonable to decree that Socrates should be honoured by comparing him with Hercules, who cast monstrosities out from the sensible world, while he [i.e., Socrates] destroyed them in the mental one. They further proposed that in accordance with Socratic opinion, it should be ordered that judgment on mere human matters should be suspended for the future and the correct balance between affirmation and denial should be retained. Therefore, this would avoid the obstinate rocks which so often induced shipwrecks in the intellect, and moreover, it would lead eloquence, as the proper exercise of human beings, to achieve its peak, leading to the happy success of the wits. It would thus have a wide space in which to ramble, being unrestricted and not constricted into any enclosed or limited dogma. And, in summary, they concluded that this suspension of judgment was a successful remedy to heal and smooth away the blisters and swellings of our minds.
Yet Alcmaeon, a well-known professor of dogmata from the Pythagorean sect, strongly reacted to those who attempted to absolve Socrates by claiming that this judgment surpassed the limit of clemency. [He claimed that] the dignity of human doctrines, on which the decorum of humankind relies, had to be defended. He continued that this issue was most considerable and of relevant importance because of the negative consequences which could follow from Socrates’ indemnity: namely, that the entire intellectual universe—which is no less spacious and extensive than the real one—would be damned and demolished at a stroke; furthermore, that the venerated memory of many lauded men who had suffered in order to leave the revered records of their doctrines to posterity would be abolished. Moreover, that Socrates had shown himself to be a greater enemy of humankind than Timon himself, because he had attempted to induce human beings to assign themselves the role of brutes by discrediting doctrines, which differentiate the latter from the former.
Yet Plato, pursuing a middle path, indeed spoke in this way:
“My writings give evident proof of the reverence in which I used to hold Socrates, a friend and preceptor of mine, since I would always speak about him with philosophical decorum and I have entrusted them [i.e., my writings] to future posterity under the protection of his name. Nevertheless, I believe that there is no one in this most noble assembly who does not know the esteem in which I [also] hold human doctrines. Indeed, I have consumed not only a substantial part of my patrimony, but also a considerable portion of my lifetime in apprehending them. Therefore, I am wholeheartedly going to utter my opinion concerning the way in which Socrates must be judged.
“I consider then that it is reasonable that we should follow the same rule regarding him that he adopts in judging the things that appear to him: namely that just as he withholds his assent, so will we suspend our judgment concerning him. And we will not reach any peremptory decision thus far by preventing a final sentence in this way for as long as any more evident instance that could lead us to absolve or condemn him may emerge. In this way, he will be free of those who would maliciously say about him that although they sued him, ordering him to defend himself, and he was not absolved, nevertheless, he was not paying for his fault. Likewise, [he will be free] of others who are his supporters, who would suppose that since we had adopted his own style towards him—namely the suspension of judgment—then we had approved his rule and hinted at his absolution.
“From our decision, there will emerge not only the following advantage—namely that Socrates’ reputation will not be damaged and his doctrine will not be discredited—but also the further benefit: that people will become more circumspect in the future. Indeed, they will restrain themselves from pronouncing their dogmata with immoderate obstinacy as though they were irrefutable. Furthermore, they will not give their assent to vain phantasms as hurriedly as they used to, for they will have in their minds that Socrates, who was so doubtful and hesitant concerning his own knowledge, was not condemned or mocked because of this.”
Plato’s proposal was applauded and approved, and for that time, they did not make any decision concerning the issue. Hence, it happened that since the Academy had accepted the charge [of Socrates] but had not acquitted him, Socrates’ fame spread in a different way: it appeared very suspicious to the common people, since he had not been absolved, while some of the wise men continued to hold him in the same high esteem as before.
Notes
Words in brackets appear in the original translation.
Credits
Published in: The Posen Library of Jewish Culture and Civilization, vol. 5.
