Bavli Bava Kamma

Why [pay compensation]? The Merciful One says an eye for [taḥat] an eye (Exodus 21:24). Perhaps one should say it refers literally [to putting out] the eye [of the offender]?

Let this not enter your mind, as it has been taught: You might think that if he blinded his eye, his [the offender’s eye] should be blinded, or if he cut off his arm, his [the offender’s arm] should be cut off, or if he broke his leg, his [the offender’s leg] should be broken. [Not so; for] scripture says: One who strikes a human being . . . One who strikes an animal . . . (Leviticus 24:17–18); just as compensation is to be paid in the case of injuring an animal, so also in the case of injuring a person, compensation is to be paid.

And if it occurs to you to point out that scripture says: You shall not take ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of a capital crime (Numbers 35:31), [I can reply that] it is only for the life of a murderer that you may not take monetary satisfaction, whereas you may take monetary satisfaction [even] for the principal limbs, even though these cannot be restored. [ . . . ]

It was taught: R. Dostai b. Judah says: An eye for [taḥat] an eye means monetary compensation. You say monetary compensation, but perhaps [scripture intends] actual retaliation [by putting out an eye]? Then what will you say where the eye of one was big and the eye of the other little? How can I, in this case, apply the principle of eye for eye?

If, however, you say that in such a case [wherein the eye of the injured and of the one who caused injury are different sizes] monetary compensation will have to be taken, did not the Torah state: You shall have one manner of law (Leviticus 24:22), that the manner of law should be the same in all cases? I might reply: What is the difficulty [even in that case]? Perhaps for eyesight taken away [from the injured] the Merciful One stated that eyesight is to be taken away from him [the offender]? For if you will not say this, how could capital punishment be applied in the case of a small man killing a large man or a large man killing a small man, seeing that the Torah says, You shall have one manner of law (ibid.), that the manner of law should be the same in all cases, unless you say that for a life taken away the Merciful One ordered that his life would be taken away from him [the murderer]? Similarly here, for eyesight taken away from him [the injured], the Merciful One ordered eyesight to be taken away from him [the offender]? [Hence, we should understand it literally.]

It was taught [in another baraita]: R. Simeon bar Yoḥai says: An eye for [taḥat] an eye (Exodus 21:24) means monetary compensation. You say monetary compensation, but perhaps actual retaliation [by putting out an eye] is meant? What if a blind man put out the eye of another man, or an amputee cut off the hand of another, or a lame person broke the leg of another? How can I carry out [the principle of retaliation of] an eye for an eye in this case, seeing that the Torah says, You shall have one manner of law (Leviticus 24:22), implying that the manner of law should be the same in all cases?

I might reply: What is the difficulty in this case? Perhaps, where it is possible [to carry out the principle of retaliation that] it is to be carried out, and where it is impossible, it is impossible, and the offender is released? For if you will not say this, what could be done in the case of a person afflicted with a fatal organic disease who kills a healthy person? You must therefore admit that it is only possible [to apply to the law of retaliation], when it is possible [and we apply it], and where it is impossible, it is impossible, and the offender is released.

The school of R. Ishmael taught: Scripture says: [A fracture for a fracture, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. As he injured a person] so shall it be given to him (Leviticus 24:20). The word given can apply only to money. But if so, does the phrase: As he has injured a person (Leviticus 24:20) similarly refer to money?!

It may be replied that at the school of R. Ishmael, this text was expounded as a superfluous verse. Since it has already been written: And if a man maims his neighbor, as he has done, so shall it be done to him (Leviticus 24:19), why do we subsequently require the words: So shall it be given to him (Leviticus 24:20)? [These unnecessary words must have some additional reference.] We can infer that it refers to monetary compensation. [But still,] why the words: As he injured a person (Leviticus 24:20)? Since it was necessary to write: So shall it be given to him (ibid.), the text also writes: As he injured a person (Leviticus 24:20).

The school of R. Ḥiyya taught: Scripture says [in the case of conspiring false witnesses]: And do not show pity. A life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,] a hand in [exchange for] hand, [a foot for a foot] (Deuteronomy 19:21), meaning something that is given from hand to hand, and what is that? Money. But if so, then the [next] words, foot in [exchange for] foot should be similarly understood!

It may be replied that at the school of R. Ḥiyya this text was expounded as a superfluous verse, for it has already been written: Then you shall do to him [the false witness] as he had intended to do to his brother (Deuteronomy 19:19). If you assume [that this latter verse, Deuteronomy 19:21, refers to] actual retaliation [for injury], why do I need the words hand in hand? This proves that it [the first part of the verse] means monetary compensation. As for the words foot in foot, having written hand in hand, the text also wrote foot in foot. [ . . . ]

R. Ashi said: [The principle of monetary compensation] could be derived from [the verbal analogy, a gezerah shavah of the term] “for” [taḥat, occurring in connection with humans] with the term “for” [taḥat] occurring in connection with cattle. It is written here: An eye for [taḥat] an eye (Exodus 21:24), and it is also written there: He shall surely pay ox for [taḥat] ox (Exodus 21:36). [This indicates that] just as in the latter case monetary compensation is intended, so also in the former case monetary compensation is intended. But why are you drawing an analogy to “for” [taḥat] from “for” [taḥat] [mentioned in connection] with cattle, rather than “for” [taḥat] [mentioned in connection] with [the killing of] humans, as it is written: you shall give life for [taḥat] life (Exodus 21:23), so that, just as in the case of murder it is actual retaliation, so also here it means actual retaliation? [It may be answered that] we infer [the law governing a case of] injury from [the law governing another case of] injury rather than [the law governing a case of] injury from [the law applicable in the case of] murder.

But why not say, on the contrary, that it is more logical to derive [the law applying to] humans from [a law that similarly applies to] humans than to derive [the law applying to] humans from [the law that applies to] cattle? R. Ashi therefore said: It is derived by analogy from for [taḥat] he has violated her (Deuteronomy 22:29). Thus we derive [the law in a case involving] humans from [a law that is similarly applicable to] humans and [a case of] injury from [a similar case of] injury.

Translated by Christine Hayes.